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Blockholder Structures and power mechanisms in family firms 
Abstract 
We extend the work of Fattoum-Guedri, Guedri and Delmar (2017) by suggesting 
that the number of family blockholders moderates the relationship between the 
distribution of voting power between family and non-family blockholders and firm 
performance. We argue that the participation of multiple generations of family 
members in the firm’s ownership leads to greater diversity of perspectives that 
generates potential conflict over the distribution of resources. We highlight four 
power mechanisms to explain why family blockholders’ conflicting and/or misaligned 
preferences and objectives might influence the nature of the negotiation between the 
family and the non-family blockholder and impact family firm performance.  
Introduction 
Focusing on blockholder structures within family firms, Fattoum-Guedri, Guedri, 
and Delmar (2017) show that a balanced distribution of voting power between family 
and non-family blockholder improves firm performance. They also demonstrate that 
the number of blockholder types moderates the positive relationship between a more 
balanced distribution of voting power and firm performance. We extend their work by 
suggesting that the number of the family blockholders (i.e. when various different 
family members hold blocks of shares) is another moderator of the relationship 
between blockholder voting power symmetry and firm performance. While the 
authors integrate principal-principal agency and familiness perspectives to support 
their study, we draw from power and negotiation theories (e.g., Kim, Pinkley, & 
Fragale, 2005; Wolfe & McGinn, 2005; Rubin & Brown, 1975) to explain the 
mechanisms through which the number of family blockholders works as a boundary 
condition for the hypothesis that a more symmetrical distribution of voting power 
among family and non-family blockholders is beneficial for firm performance. We 
argue that the participation of multiple generations of family members in the firm’s 
ownership leads to greater diversity of perspectives that generate potential conflicts 
over the distribution of resources. We highlight four power mechanisms – potential 
power, perceived power, power games, and realized power - to explain why the 
potential for conflict and misalignment of preferences, objectives and visions for the 
family firm among family blockholders may influence negotiations with non-family 
blockholders and, as a result, impact family firm performance. We draw on power and 
negotiation perspectives to explain the combined effect of both moderators (number 
of family blockholders and number of blockholders types) on the relationship under 
investigation. We offer directions for future research.  
The moderating role of the number of family blockholders 
We extend the work of Fattoum-Guiedri et al. (2017) by arguing that the nature of 
the relationship between a balanced distribution of voting power between family and 
non-family blockholders and firm performance is conditional on the number of the 
family blockholders. We suggest that this positive relationship between voting power 
symmetry and firm performance is weaker as the number of family members involved 
in the ownership structure increases (e.g. from multiple generations and in-laws). The 
involvement of multiple generations in a business has the advantage of preserving 
tacit knowledge and transmitting family connections across generations (Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2005). However, this advantage can erode as the number of family 
blockholders grows due to having to reconcile potentially conflicting interests and 
misaligned preferences (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Schulze et al., 2003). 
For the relationships espoused by Fattoum-Guedri et al. (2017) to hold, the 
assumption that family blockholders think and act as a unitary group of owners with 
shared interests is required. However, the family firm literature points to 
heterogeneity among group of family firm owners resulting “from the natural drift of 
families across generations and the resulting increase in the complexity of family 
ownership over time” (Zellweger & Kammerlander, 2015:1281). This suggests that 
the participation of more family members in the firm’s ownership leads to a greater 
diversity of perspectives and undermines the ability of the family to exercise power as 
a unified blockholder group when it comes to negotiating with the non-family 
blockholder group over corporate strategies and the distribution of wealth created by 
the firm (Miller et al., 2013).  
Consistent with power and negotiation theories (e.g., French & Rave, 1959; Kim et 
al., 2005; Wolfe & McGin, 2005), we claim that a context of conflicts and misaligned 
interests amongst family blockholders might redefine the potential power of the 
parties (Crozier, 1964). Changes in related perceived power of the parties creates the 
opportunity to perform power games to gain legitimacy and supremacy in order to 
extract benefits from their interaction (i.e. realized power) (Kim et al., 2005). 
Therefore, we argue that the nature of the negotiation between family and non-family 
blockholders when it comes to making decisions over the use of firm resources 
depends on four power mechanisms – potential power, perceive power, power games, 
and realized power. We analyze these mechanisms in turn. 
Potential power. Within the power and negotiation literatures, potential power is 
defined as the capacity of negotiators to obtain benefits from their agreement (Kim et 
al., 2005; Wrong, 1968). Family blockholders’ potential power derives not only from 
their individual voting rights, but also from their ability to leverage the relative 
cohesion of the family to claim resources from their agreement with non-family 
blockholders (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). Resources can then be 
opportunistically diverted for personal use (Morck & Yeung 2003) or wisely 
employed to develop a unique competitive advantage (Habbershon & Williams, 
1999). However, the presence of multiple divergent and potentially conflicting 
perspectives among family blockholders changes their potential power as a group. 
While they can still count on their voting power, they are less likely to be able to act 
as a cohesive group to extract benefits in their favor; the family blockholders’ 
capacity to exert power over non-family blockholders is therefore constrained. 
Perceived power. Perceived power is defined as negotiators’ assessments of a 
party’s potential power in the relationship (Emerson, 1962; Kim et al., 2005). 
Perceptions of power emerge from a process of comparison: people compare their 
dependence on their counterpart with what they believe is their counterpart’s 
dependence on them (Blau, 1964). If non-family blockholders are thought to be part 
of a stable coalition (Bennedsen & Wolfenzon, 2000) by family blockholders, then 
the former are perceived to be more powerful than family blockholders, whose 
cohesiveness is simultaneously threatened by the aforementioned conflicts and 
misaligned preferences. Perceptions of unequal power affect blockholders’ motivation 
for negotiating and their subsequent behavior (Rubin et al., 1994). Negotiations can 
be adversely affected when the relatively high-power non-family blockholders can 
prioritize the satisfaction of their own interests over those of the family blockholders 
(Rubin & Brown, 1975). This dynamic has implications for the distribution of 
resources, which is likely to disadvantage the relatively less powerful family 
blockholders (e.g. Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010). It is important to 
highlight, however, that the absence of a stable coalition among non-family 
blockholders is likely to lead to a different outcome; an option that we discuss later.  
Power games/tactics. Power games refer to negotiators’ efforts to use or change 
the power relationship (Kim at al., 2005). Power-use tactics refer to the ways in which 
negotiators may attempt to leverage existing power capabilities (Lawler, 1992). For 
example, as claimed earlier, non-family blockholders can form a coalition to take 
advantage of the conflict-laden situation that might characterize a family blockholder 
group that comprises many family blockholders. They can also engage in tactics of 
pressure, legitimation, exchange, ingratiation, rational persuasion, inspirational 
appeal, consultation, and personal appeal to obtain desired outcomes (Kipnis & 
Schmidt, 1983; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). In contrast, power-change tactics refer to the 
ways in which negotiators may attempt to alter the power relationship, typically to 
improve their own power relative to that of their counterpart (Lawler, 1992). For 
example, family blockholders may apply power-change tactics when they believe they 
do not hold enough potential power to satisfy their personal interests. However, 
before trying to alter their power against non-family blockholders, each family 
blockholder is likely to initiate power-change games within the family ownership.   
When the ownership is characterized by several contentious family blockholders, 
their votes enable them to cancel one another’s initiatives (Ward, 2004). To avoid this 
counterproductive exercise of power, some family members can engage in intensive 
sensegiving activities.  Sensegiving activities consist of various tactics individual 
family blockholders can use to impose their particular worldviews on others and 
influence meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organizational reality (Smith et al., 2010; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). While such 
sensegiving activities seek to enforce individual preferences by influencing key 
strategic decisions, these acts of persuasion can compromise the future of the family 
firm by challenging norms and values, and consequently, the family firm’s very 
culture (Gephart, 1993). However, the forms of sensegiving and their effectiveness 
depend on the family blockholder’s position in the prevailing power structure and in 
the family firm’s given historical legacy (Drori & Ellis, 2011). 
Realized power. Realized power is the extent to which negotiators extract benefits 
from their interaction. Because the extraction of benefits is achieved through the 
implementation of power games, the type and magnitude of a negotiator’s power 
game efforts directly influences the extent to which that party has realized power over 
the relationship (Kim et al., 2005). For example, to the extent that non-family 
blockholders are able to form a stable coalition and gain advantage over the family 
blockholder group, they can extract resources from the family firm to satisfy the 
interests of all shareholders (Connelly et al., 2010). Similarly, to the extent that family 
blockholders are influential in their sensegiving activities, they can extract resources 
from the family firm to primarily satisfy their own personal interests (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2004). This suggests that when power is unequal, the extraction of benefits 
from the interaction is primarily oriented to help the high-power parties achieve their 
goals and advance their interests at the expense of their counterparts (Rubin et al., 
1994). As a result, when power is unequal, firm value creation and maximization may 
no longer be recognized as the shared primary goal.  
In sum, drawing from power and negotiation theories, we argue that a larger 
number of family blockholders creates the conditions that might lead to the redrawing 
of power structures beyond those provided by formal voting rights. We suggest that 
the four power mechanisms can help explain changes in blockholders’ motivations 
during negotiations and use of resources to satisfy their own interests at the expense 
of firm value creation. We conclude by claiming that this situation is likely to 
compromise the performance of the firm.  
On the basis of the arguments outlined above, we suggest that the relationship 
between a balanced distribution of voting power among family and non-family 
blockholders and firm performance is contingent on the number of family 
blockholders. The presence of conflicting interests and misaligned preferences among 
family blockholders triggers power mechanisms that increase the chances of 
divergence of blockholders’ goals away from value creation and/or improvement of 
firm performance. Accordingly, we propose the following:  
Proposition 1: The number of family blockholders moderates the positive 
relationship between the symmetry of family and non-family blockholders’ voting 
power and firm performance such that the positive relationship between voting power 
symmetry and firm performance will be weaker as the number of family blockholders 
increases.  
Given the potentially detrimental effects of a large number of family blockholders 
on firm performance, it becomes important to identify the conditions that help 
establish a more equal perception of power between family and non-family 
blockholders. To complement the work of Fattoum-Guedri et al. (2017), we suggest 
that a large number of non-family blockholder types might also influence power 
dynamics and negotiations. Similar to the arguments above in relation to the effects of 
having a larger number of family blockholders, multiple types of non-family 
blockholders are likely to compromise non-family blockholders’ ability to behave as a 
stable and united group and leverage their cohesiveness against the potentially 
conflict-laden family blockholder group.  
This potential for conflict among non-family blockholders due to the presence of 
multiple types likley influences the perception of negotiators’ power. Having both lost 
the opportunity to exercise power as a unified blockholder group, family and non-
family blockholders may be more likely to perceive themselves in an equal power 
relationship. When this happens, they are more likely to realize that there is a mutual 
dependence on one another. Negotiators come to recognize that helping their 
counterparts achieve their goals, will, in turn, advance their own interests (Rubin et 
al., 1994). This instrumental concern for others as well as oneself limits the activation 
of hostile power games and redirects the motivation to negotiate in a manner that 
leads towards those outcomes that increase the opportunity to create common value 
(Rubin & Brown, 1975). For family and non-family blockholders, as the only 
common source of value is in relation to the family firm, we propose that in the 
circumstances outlined above (i.e. when both family and non-family blockholders are 
characterized by diversity), negotiations will be directed towards integrative solutions 
that seek to maximize firm value creation (i.e. firm performance). We argue that the 
number of blockholder types will in essence have a neutralizing effect on the number 
of family blockholders as a moderator of the relationship between blockholder power 
symmetry and firm performance. We therefore suggest that: 
Proposition 2: A large number of blockholders type weakens the moderating effect 
of the number of family blockholders on the positive relationship between the 
symmetry of family and non-family blockholders’ voting power and firm performance, 
such that the positive relationship between voting power symmetry and firm 
performance is more likely to hold when both the number of blockholder types and the 
number of family blockholders increase.  
 
Discussion and direction for future research 
The work of Fattoum-Guedri et al. (2017) represents a step toward a deeper 
understanding of the complexity of ownership structures and control mechanisms 
within family firms. This commentary has sought to guide future researchers wishing 
to look beyond the formal distribution of voting power between family and non-
family blockholders. Our propositions - built on power and negotiation literatures - 
emphasize the role of (potential) conflict among blockholders and the power 
mechanisms such conflicts might trigger.  
A logical step forward is to test these propositions. Consistent with Fattoum-
Guedri et al. (2017), future researchers can deploy moderated hierarchical regression 
analysis to examine the relationship between voting power symmetry and firm 
performance, as well as the proposed moderating effects of the number of family 
blockholders alone and then combined with the number of blockholder types (Dawson 
& Richter, 2006). However, we also suggest that a qualitative study can help 
understand how conflict among blockholders might generate power mechanisms that 
redefine motivations and behaviors during negotiations. Qualitative approaches are 
needed to observe power games and sensemaking activities performed at the level of 
rhetorical, discursive or symbolic articulation of organizational reality. We encourage 
future scholars to look to exemplars like Drori & Ellis (2011) that seek to capture the 
contextual and contested nature of power games and sensemaking activities. 
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